Introduction

Shortly after the Peloponnesian War began, plague had decimated the Athenian population, Pericles had died of it, and the war dragged on. Athenian democracy fell to the leadership of Cleon the Tanner -- a man of the lower classes who came to power because of the democratic reforms of Pericles. In 428, the city of Mitylene on the island of Lesbos had pulled out of its alliance with Athens and joined Sparta. Within a year, Athens pushed the Spartans out of Lesbos. What should be done? Cleon had convened the Athenian ekklesia and argued that all male Mitylenians must be destroyed, and the women and children sold into slavery. The ekklesia voted in favor of Cleon's plan. A ship was sent to Lesbos with those instructions.

The next day, the Athenians reconsidered their decision. This provided the opportunity to Thucydides (Book 3:36-50) to explore degeneration in Athenian democracy, the problem an empire posed for Athens, and the psychology of demagogues -- all in this short but provacative piece called The Mytilenian Debate.

Modern historians believe that Thucydides cross-examined witnesses, then wrote it up in his own words in order to instruct his readers. Thucydides believed that superficial facts reveal inner -- even universal -- motives, trends and character traits. He also held to the idea that history went around in cycles and would repeat itself again.

Questions to begin with: What, precisely, is Cleon's argument and conclusion, and what were they based on? And with Diodotus, what was his argument and conclusion, and what were they based on? What is similar and/or different between the two, e.g., in assumptions and goals? What does that tell you? Finally, what is Thucydides' bias here? How do you know?

The English translation here might be a bit archaic, but the ideas involved are crucially important to the study of history, and to our own lives (and democracy) today. There are many complex questions here, but if you think critically and seriously, the benefits will present themselves, and you gain from the doing.

Text:

An assembly was called immediately, and after much expression of opinion upon both sides, Cleon, son of Cleaenetus, the same who had carried the former motion of putting the Mitylenians to death, the most violent man at Athens, and at that time by far the most powerful with the Assembly, came forward again and addressed the Assembly:

"I have often before now been convinced that a democracy is incapable of empire, and never more so than by your present change of mind in the matter of Mitylene. Fears or plots being unknown to you in your daily relations with each other, you feel just the same with regard to your allies, and never reflect that the mistakes into which you may be led by listening to their appeals, or by giving way to your own compassion, are full of danger to yourselves, and bring you no thanks for your weakness from your allies; entirely forgetting that your empire is a despotism and your subjects disaffected conspirators, whose obedience is ensured not by your suicidal concessions, but by the superiority given you by your own strength and not their loyalty. The most alarming feature in the case is the constant change of measures with which we appear to be threatened, and our seeming ignorance of the fact that bad laws which are never changed are better for a city than good ones that have no authority; that unlearned loyalty is more serviceable than quick-witted insubordination; and that ordinary men usually manage public affairs better than their more gifted fellows....

"Our mistake has been to distinguish the Mitylenians as we have done: had they been long ago treated like the rest, they never would have so far forgotten themselves, human nature being as surely made arrogant by consideration as it is awed by firmness. Let them now therefore be punished as their crime requires, and do not, while you condemn the aristocracy, absolve the people. This is certain, that all attacked you without distinction, although they might have come over to us and been now again in possession of their city. But no, they thought it safer to throw in their lot with the aristocracy and so joined their rebellion! Consider therefore: if you subject to the same punishment the ally who is forced to rebel by the enemy, and him who does so by his own free choice, which of them, think you, is there that will not rebel upon the slightest pretext; when the reward of success is freedom, and the penalty of failure nothing so very terrible? We meanwhile shall have to risk our money and our lives against one state after another; and if successful, shall receive a ruined town from which we can no longer draw the revenue upon which our strength depends; while if unsuccessful, we shall have an enemy the more upon our hands, and shall spend the time that might be employed in combating our existing foes in warring with our own allies.

"To sum up shortly, I say that if you follow my advice you will do what is just towards the Mitylenians, and at the same time expedient; while by a different decision you will not oblige them so much as pass sentence upon yourselves. For if they were right in rebelling, you must be wrong in ruling. However, if, right or wrong, you determine to rule, you must carry out your principle and punish the Mitylenians as your interest requires; or else you must give up your empire and cultivate honesty without danger. Make up your minds, therefore, to give them like for like; and do not let the victims who escaped the plot be more insensible than the conspirators who hatched it; but reflect what they would have done if victorious over you, especially they were the aggressors. It is they who wrong their neighbour without a cause, that pursue their victim to the death, on account of the danger which they foresee in letting their enemy survive; since the object of a wanton wrong is more dangerous, if he escape, than an enemy who has not this to complain of."

"Do not, therefore, be traitors to yourselves, but recall as nearly as possible the moment of suffering and the supreme importance which you then attached to their reduction; and now pay them back in their turn, without yielding to present weakness or forgetting the peril that once hung over you. Punish them as they deserve, and teach your other allies by a striking example that the penalty of rebellion is death. Let them once understand this and you will not have so often to neglect your enemies while you are fighting with your own confederates."

Such were the words of Cleon. After him Diodotus, son of Eucrates, who had also in the previous assembly spoken most strongly against putting the Mitylenians to death, came forward and spoke as follows:

"I do not blame the persons who have reopened the case of the Mitylenians, nor do I approve the protests which we have heard against important questions being frequently debated. I think the two things most opposed to good counsel are haste and passion; haste usually goes hand in hand with folly, passion with coarseness and narrowness of mind....

"However, I have not come forward either to oppose or to accuse in the matter of Mitylene; indeed, the question before us as sensible men is not their guilt, but our interests. Though I prove them ever so guilty, I shall not, therefore, advise their death, unless it be expedient; nor though they should have claims to indulgence, shall I recommend it, unless it be dearly for the good of the country. I consider that we are deliberating for the future more than for the present; and where Cleon is so positive as to the useful deterrent effects that will follow from making rebellion capital, I, who consider the interests of the future quite as much as he, as positively maintain the contrary.....

"Only consider what a blunder you would commit in doing as Cleon recommends. As things are at present, in all the cities the people is your friend, and either does not revolt with the oligarchy, or, if forced to do so, becomes at once the enemy of the insurgents; so that in the war with the hostile city you have the masses on your side. But if you butcher the people of Mitylene, who had nothing to do with the revolt, and who, as soon as they got arms, of their own motion surrendered the town, first you will commit the crime of killing your benefactors; and next you will play directly into the hands of the higher classes, who when they induce their cities to rise, will immediately have the people on their side, through your having announced in advance the same punishment for those who are guilty and for those who are not. On the contrary, even if they were guilty, you ought to seem not to notice it, in order to avoid alienating the only class still friendly to us. In short, I consider it far more useful for the preservation of our empire voluntarily to put up with injustice, than to put to death, however justly, those whom it is our interest to keep alive. As for Cleon's idea that in punishment the claims of justice and expediency can both be satisfied, facts do not confirm the possibility of such a combination.

"Confess, therefore, that this is the wisest course, and without conceding too much either to pity or to indulgence, by neither of which motives do I any more than Cleon wish you to be influenced, upon the plain merits of the case before you, be persuaded by me to try calmly those of the Mitylenians whom Paches sent off as guilty, and to leave the rest undisturbed. This is at once best for the future, and most terrible to your enemies at the present moment; inasmuch as good policy against an adversary is superior to the blind attacks of brute force."

Such were the words of Diodotus. The two opinions thus expressed were the ones that most directly contradicted each other; and the Athenians, notwithstanding their change of feeling, now proceeded to a division, in which the show of hands was almost equal, although the motion of Diodotus carried the day. Another galley was at once sent off in haste, for fear that the first might reach Lesbos in the interval, and the city be found destroyed; the first ship having about a day and a night's start. Wine and barley-cakes were provided for the vessel by the Mitylenian ambassadors, and great promises made if they arrived in time; which caused the men to use such diligence upon the voyage that they took their meals of barley-cakes kneaded with oil and wine as they rowed, and only slept by turns while the others were at the oar. Luckily they met with no contrary wind, and the first ship making no haste upon so horrid an errand, while the second pressed on in the manner described, the first arrived so little before them, that Paches had only just had time to read the decree, and to prepare to execute the sentence, when the second put into port and prevented the massacre. The danger of Mitylene had indeed been great.  -- (From The History of the Peloponnesian War by Thucydides. Translated by Richard Crawley. )

What Value(s) might we come away with?

Whether or not cyclical history really occurs, questions remain: Are we ready to spot demagogues? Are we ready to keep from "Loosing our heads when all about you others are loosing theirs....?" Is Cleon right when he said that "Democracy is incapable of empire?"  Having identified bias in historical sources, what can we do with that knowledge?

The above speech illustrates Athenian democracy in action. What does your analysis reveal about the nature of Athenian democracy? What is the "received view" on Athenian democracy? How does the thinking individual deal with this?

Given that the readings before you identify fundamental and fatal flaws in fifth-century Athenian Democracy, would you say that the problems primarily reside in the leadership, the people or the method(s) of Athenian democracy? Have modern democracies solved the problems that are apparent here? If so, how? If not, explain. On the other hand, if you think that the above reading does not reveal problems in Athenian Democracy, explain your position.

Finally, what view might a later Roman thinker come away with concerning democracy -- after reading this? Hmmm.....
 

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